After Jo Swinson

Amid the chatter and analysis, British politics' bit-part actors, the Liberal Democrats, have almost entirely slid from view. This isn't to say what happened to them wasn't devastating. For a number of reasons, despite Labour's seat loss and inroads into traditional seats the result was bad but not apocalyptic for it, whereas LibDems have got to really start asking themselves searching questions.

Consider the performance. 3.7m votes, up four percentage points on 2017. And, thanks to the vagaries of First Past the Post, a net loss of one seat. Okay, that loss was Jo Swinson's welcome collapse by the slimmest of margins but a result is a result. But look more closely and there are some serious troubles. Forget for a moment the slew of defectors they took on from the other parties, in this election the party gained five but lost six, a feat mirroring what we saw in 2017 where five seats were lost despite a net gain of four. This suggests a real difficulty in putting down roots as well as their greater exposure to electoral volatility.

That however is not a natural force. Electoral volatility is the product of underlying social trends and can be stoked and exploited under the right circumstances, which Boris Johnson has just demonstrated. The truth of the matter is the LibDems could have done much better, but they fundamentally misread the situation. What they got right was how exploiting remain would, from the narrow perspective of party building, offer the opportunity of winning over Labour and Conservative voters. What they got wrong was the catastrophic execution.

The last couple of year's worth of by-elections has shown a propensity for the LibDems to take seats from the Tories more so than any other party. It was reasonable to assume those making the switch were the layer of Tory voters who were appalled at Theresa May's mishandling of Brexit, and the reckless affectations of Boris Johnson in office. Also, the 2017 election had showed Tim Farron's strategy of going after Labour voters by pretending to be more moderate lefties was a non-starter. And so after the election of Jo Swinson, a pivot to the right and treating the EU elections as a second referendum served them well. The Brexit Party was the run away winner, but picking up 16 MEPs certainly did the trick. But, at the peak of her powers, Swinson scattered the seeds of her own destruction.

The first was making the novice's error of treating the EU elections like a real election. About only a third participate, they are more likely to be older voters and, as second order elections, are the occasion for protest voting. All Swinson needed to do was look at UKIP's performance in EU elections vs parliamentary elections since gaining their first berths in Brussels back in 1999. They helped drive the Tory agenda and got the referendum to happen, but it did not translate into seats. And so we had the risky turn to hard remain, a gamble of doubling down on what netted success previously would, contrary to all evidence, cash in. The problem was simply saying that the referendum should be set aside, even if a LibDem government is never going to happen, certainly helped feed the 'metro elites want to steal your Brexit' line and contributed to firming up the Tory vote, while simultaneously presenting as illiberal and anti-democratic. There is daring, and then there is reckless.

The second big issue was how the LibDems adapted themselves to the incomers via Change UK's miserable demise, and then directly from the Tories. Here, Swinson was guided by parliamentary and not electoral politics. Given their participation in the trashing of Jeremy Corbyn and then flying the coup because, among other things, Labour Party members were no confidencing them, Swinson pushed Corbynphobia to ridiculous extremes, going as far to say she would not countenance supporting a caretaker Labour government even if it was committed to a second referendum. That was good enough to get the former CHUKa artists on board, and no doubt helped convince right wing but pro-EU Tory MPs that the LibDems were worth a punt. This, however, was not going to play out electorally. Presumably, Swinson thought her anti-Corbynism would endear her to those centre-leaning, ballpark-remainy Tory voters too. In fact, by barely saying anything about policy, apart from the dull-as-ditchwater "skills wallet" and joining in the Corbyn-is-evil pile on, the LibDems were successful in taking away a thin but significant - in some seats - layer of voters from Labour, but by adding to the cacophony they only reminded remainy Tories that Labour was their nemesis and there was only one way of seeing Corbyn off: by voting Tory.

In addition to the politics was the presentation. Good grief, the presentation. Never before in British politics has a party run such a narcissistic campaign around a figure with so very little to shout about. The reasoning was as someone barely introduced to audiences beyond the Westminster cognoscenti, a bit of flash branding was married to the totally dishonest campaigning, the party could alternately hoodwink and charm voters into backing them, that somehow the debut of Swinson decked out in anti-Corbynism, centrism, and remain would all come together in a Cleggmania repeat. It didn't work out that way. While not an incompetent performer in front of studio audiences, we had the peculiar spectacle of her having to account more for Tory policies like the bedroom tax and cuts to public services than, um, the Tories. Johnson certainly got stick for his past record and his lies, but not for the record of a party that has been in Number 10 for nearly a decade. Instead, rather than being the hope that could cut through the middle, the Tories regarded the LibDems a passing dust cart and duly left it to them to carry their refuse.

Where now then? Their strategy in tatters, their leader gone, and their raison d'etre settled for the foreseeable. Of course, it first depends on who the new leader is going to be. Ed Davey and Baroness Sal Brinton are caretaking presently, and no doubt Davey's going to have another shot. And then there is Layla Moran, whose name was floated during the last leadership contest. It was also said during this summer's silliness that she was one of several MPs open to working with Jeremy Corbyn's Labour. Obviously, what happens to the party next depends on who they select. Davey was as much signed up to the hard remain/Corbyn-sceptic/strong leader rubbish as Swinson was and, as a good Orange Book'er and former coalition minister there's unlikely to be much of a switch. The only real question is how long will he resist before taking the "short cut" of campaigning to re-join the EU than rebuilding properly.

Therefore, assuming she stands and her pragmatism goes beyond parliamentary jockeying, Moran seems better placed to begin the process of recovery. And that recovery means concentrating fire on the Tories, helping build a better relationship with Labour - whoever Jeremy's successor turns out to be - and putting the Orange Book in the bin. Her model is not Nick Clegg, nor Farron nor Swinson, but further back - the well-liked Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy. They were able to build the strength of the LibDems over time by explicitly positioning themselves as part of a broad anti-Tory coalition and, when Blair was in power, a fuzzily centre leftish conscience that managed to appeal to floating Tory voters who, for whatever reason, would never countenance voting Labour. Such a move presents Labour with its own challenges, but it also does the Tories. If at the next election the Tories are going to be dumped out of office, that means Labour does the heavy lifting but the LibDems also have their own part to play.

The question is now we face up to four or five wasted years of climate inaction, economic stagnation, attacks on working people, and the scapegoating of minorities, will the Liberal Democrats step up to the plate?