Sunday 24 September 2023

Habermas's Legitimation Crisis Today

Yesterday I finished Jurgen Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. Published in May 50 years ago, it is probably his best known and most explicitly political and Marxist of his works. Written as the post-war consensus was cracking, this was a meditation on how we needed to rethink notions of crisis in light if the systemic change capitalism had undergone in the advanced countries since the war. I.e. The expansion of the state into more areas of social life and the rise of state-directed 'organised capitalism'. Drawing heavily on systems theory and earlier insights via Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons, Habermas argued the shift from the law of value to the state as the primary organiser of production and social reproduction meant crisis had become more complex. Marx no longer had all the answers.

Still accepting capitalism's tendency to crisis for the reasons explored in Capital, Habermas argued that economic crises were displaced onto the state, resulting in political crises. In turn, the steering media of politics coped with crisis by intervening and also displacing it onto other institutions of the state. Such as austerity, which turns a capitalist crisis into a crisis of public finances. This also had consequences for the system-legitimation and individual-motivational aspects overseen and underwritten by the state. How to justify pain for the many and riches for the few? And how to keep people trudging on the hamster wheel or work while the rewards for it diminish? In fact, while Habermas was writing about a different kind of capitalism, in a different context and informed by a different assumptions about the way of the world, this book from 1973 is very close to describing the situation we're in now.

If you can bear the functionalist/systems vocabulary, Legitimation Crisis is a worthwhile read for thinking through the interconnectedness of social formations, what constitutes a 'crisis', how crisis is managed, and why a whole-system revolutionary crisis that would wipe the slate clean is next to impossible. Habermas's accent on systems theory does have some utility - that of conveying the weight and inertia of social relationships, and therefore an implied caution against flighty, excitable politics and unrealistic assumptions. Pretty much what Timpanaro warned us about in his discussion of Marxist materialism, sans the nose of Niklas Luhmann poking out from each page.

What Habermas wasn't squeamish about was discussing the role of interests. He recognised that the post-war social order was based on a compact of class interests, and that the antagonisms between capital and labour were smoothed out (some might say policed) by negotiations and compromise, often overseen by the state. Unlike his Luhmannian and Parsonian influences, Habermas also understands that norms, which play a crucial integrative role in functionalist sociology and its forebears, were materially rooted in and negotiated around interests. What makes compromise possible and therefore the 'normal' operation of capitalism are the separation of powers (the fact that politics - the state - is separate from economics), which is variously interpreted and laid down by bourgeois constitutions, and the freedom of the individual as guaranteed by law. However, for a genuine compromise to be possible between contending classes there has to be an equitable balance of power. Where this is not present there is 'pseudo-compromise'.

Habermas is not naive. He argues that pseudo-compromise is the norm in capitalist societies. Because capital and labour are unequal and the very structure of institutions reproduce the former, capital's minority interest is what is generalised as natural, or national interests. As such, this manifestly exploitative and unjust state of affairs generate discourses of legitimation that express but fundamentally distort the competition and clash of interests.

He writes,

legitimations consist of interpretations, of narrative presentations or (for example in national law) of systematised explanations and chains of argument, that have the double function of proving that the validity claims of norm systems are legitimate and of avoiding thematisation and testing of discursive validity claims. The specific achievement of such ideologies consists in the conspicuous manner in which communication is systematically limited (pp 112-3)
Thinking about this point today, a the neoliberal settlement crumbles and the centrist B team limbers up for their turn in office, the discourse around alternatives to Rishi Sunak's paltry, plastic populism and Keir Starmer's authoritarian managerialism is strictly policed by explicit (and often crude) boundary drawing. This must keep out the politically unreasonable and unwelcome ideas that threaten the narrow basis the eroding consensus rests on. "Serious" politics is about "tough choices", and nothing else can be considered. There is no room for hope or expectations life might get better. It is excluded entirely.

Like all good works of social theory, the vocabulary Habermas brings to bear in Legitimation Crisis might not have dated well, but his arguments, insights, and conclusions are fresh because they remain relevant.

6 comments:

Blissex said...

«What Habermas wasn't squeamish about was discussing the role of interests.»

Indeed, as our blogger and myself keep repeating despite the personalities show of Westminster as reported by the right-wing media, interests are the basis of politics.

«However, for a genuine compromise to be possible between contending classes there has to be an equitable balance of power. Where this is not present there is 'pseudo-compromise'.»

We are now in the sorry situation where we have to look back to the post-WW2 “'pseudo-compromise'” with fondness. Even a “'pseudo-compromise'” is better than uncompromising thatcherism underwritten by the votes of many millions of petty bourgeois voters and by the leadership of all major parties.

«capital's minority interest is what is generalised as natural, or national interests»

As to this I have often remarked that in the right-wing media "the economy" is actually used as if "the investors" had been written instead, if not even just "Middle England property owners". Because the majority of workers ("suckers", "losers", "scroungers" in various right-wing jargons) are not part of "the economy", and in particular not of "our own".

Blissex said...

«This must keep out the politically unreasonable and unwelcome ideas that threaten the narrow basis the eroding consensus rests on. "Serious" politics is about "tough choices", and nothing else can be considered.»

https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/08/what-i-learned-from-jeremy-corbyn/
«Corbyn told me a story about having tea with Joan Maynard, former MP for Sheffield Brightside, and Harry Cohen, former MP for Leyton, shortly after the two were elected. Joan sat the two of them down and said: "If both front benches are agreed, it’s probably bad news for the workers. And if a minister ever gets up and says ‘we’re going to have to take some tough choices and some tough decisions,’ it’s a disaster for the working class. Just bear that in mind and you’ll not go far wrong."»

Since Blair (with the exception of a few years of Corbyn) the front benches have always been agreed on policy because "There Is No Alternative".

«There is no room for hope or expectations life might get better»

As usual our blogger here accepts the right-wing framing that "we are all in the same boat", everybody is doing badly except perhaps a few billionaires, and that therefore 14 millions Conservative voters do vote mindlessly for their own immiseration.

But actually the expectation of the "Middle England" (petty bourgeois) Conservative (and New Labour and LibDem) voters are for things to get better for themselves and screw-everybody-else, and thanks to property inflation and now to inflation of service prices and product prices their expectations are satisfied.

Again, when I walk around in the posh commuter or university towns of the south-east I don't see dentists, marketing managers, accountants, real estate agents, etc. selling apples, matches, shoestrings at street corners, I see them spending freely their rising wealth and incomes in M&S and John Lewis, grateful to Thatcher, Blair and most their successors for redistributing to them so much money from the powerless lower classes.

Blissex said...

«the discourse around alternatives to Rishi Sunak's paltry, plastic populism and Keir Starmer's authoritarian managerialism is strictly policed by explicit (and often crude) boundary drawing.»

For example while large prominence is given by the corporate media to personalities and cultural and identity issues, I have rarely seen mentioned what after all must be a minor detail: the effect of 2-3 years of 5-15% per year service and product price (certainly not wage) inflation have been doing to the budgets of the NHS, universities, local councils, various government departments and other "socialist" style "parasites". Their real budgets are being cut by 20-30%, nothing to see here, move on.

Zoltan Jorovic said...

I am fascinated by @Blissex analysis of the economy and those who vote conservative. "dentists, marketing managers, accountants, real estate agents" is an interesting set of people. Are they the famous Red Wall? Is this the set of voters that both Sunak and Starmer seem to be targeting with their tough on immigration, tough on protest, soft on environmental destruction policies?

Looked at from the uninformed side-lines it seems as though the two are targeting a very narrow group of Gammon-like voters, which seems unlikely to include many Dentists, or marketing managers, and much as we (unkindly) all look down on estate agents and sneer at accountants, they are not what most springs to mind when thinking Gammon.

The main motivator for changing a vote, which is what the parties target, is fear, or hope. Hope is too difficult as it requires trust and belief, while fear is stronger and easier. Even if we don't believe it, we can't be sure, so it still motivates.

As someone who lives near one of these 'posh' SE towns frequented by @Bliss I am aware of a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government. Not many are enthusiastic Starmerites, but the majority want the Tories out. Yes, they still have money to spend, but everyone can see the decay and decrepitude in the public sphere, and are worried about it. I don't expect a sudden surge in revolutionary fervour, but I can easily see a substantial drift to the Lib Dems. Given the system we have, that's as much as can be expected. Turkeys don't vote for Christmas, but they might vote for a vegan option to be made available.

Blissex said...

«"dentists, marketing managers, accountants, real estate agents" is an interesting set of people. Are they the famous Red Wall?»

In my imagination they are the Blue Wall, "Middle England", the "petty bourgeoisie". Pretty much "shopkeepers" on average, that is people who both own a small business and work in it, or derive much of their income from property/stocks rentierism, or both.

«Is this the set of voters that both Sunak and Starmer seem to be targeting with their tough on immigration, tough on protest, soft on environmental destruction policies? [...] they are not what most springs to mind when thinking Gammon.»

They are the voters targeted by Sunak, Starmer, Davey, but they are the not the minority of gammons who fall for "virtue signaling", more precisely "nastyparty signaling", even if many of them are Colonel Blimps or hang-and-flog old aunties too.

While I guess that both Sunak and Starmer do welcome the votes of gammons (who take the signaling at face value), I reckon that they do "nastyparty signaling" because they want to persuade "Middle England" rentiers that they are reliable right-wingers, that is they can be trusted on "the economy", which means property and finance speculation.

«The main motivator for changing a vote, which is what the parties target, is fear, or hope.»

But the main motivator for a vote is the principal material interest "must have" of the voter. Only when they are certain that will be satisfied many will consider secondary "nice to have" issues like culture.

What "Middle England" want is first and foremost an affluent, secure living standard powered by asset-based upward redistribution or by oligopolistic pricing power. Authoritarianism, deference, status, nationalism, are just nice-to-have pluses.

Chris Dillow recently reposted on his blog an old but very apposite point made by that "trot" from Trier:

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch03.htm
«The Tories in England long imagined that they were enthusiastic about monarchy, the church, and the beauties of the old English Constitution, until the day of danger wrung from them the confession that they are enthusiastic only about ground rent.»

Blissex said...

«these 'posh' SE towns frequented by @Bliss I am aware of a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government. Not many are enthusiastic Starmerites, but the majority want the Tories out. Yes, they still have money to spend, but everyone can see the decay and decrepitude in the public sphere, and are worried about it.»

But those are very secondary worries. Right-wing voters can be quite tolerant of private affluence and public squalor, like in the USA or Brazil or India (or Greece etc.), as long the private affluence is mostly theirs and the public squalor is mostly in other people's neighbourhoods.

«Turkeys don't vote for Christmas, but they might vote for a vegan option to be made available»

But that vegan option is not the LibDems, but New Labour, or so at least Starmer hopes. The basic problem of the LibDems is also their main advantage: unlike UKIP their base is geographically concentrated, so they can win some FPTP seats, but at the same time they cannot win an overall majority unless there is a colossal swing, and most voters know that.