Wednesday 24 July 2013

Early Soviet Diplomacy

Whether you're a Trot, Tankie or a sad sectarian (like me!) Marcel Liebman's Leninism Under Lenin is absolutely essential reading. Published 40 years ago, it paints a rigorous and meticulously-researched portrait of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. It shows how Lenin's conception of the revolutionary party passed through several phases according to the pace of class struggle in Tsarist Russia. At times conspiratorial, but mostly anarchic and democratic; small wonder the little Lenins of the British far left have not found a place for this book on their suggested reading lists. Anyway, as I haven't the time for a proper post this evening here are a few extracts from the lively early days of Soviet diplomacy.
There was then no question of submitting to diplomatic custom, and the need for recognition or the search for respectability had no place among the motives of the Soviet leaders ... The attitude of the Communist negotiators at Brest-Litovsk followed the same line. The Austro-German diplomats were amazed by the conduct of Radek when the Soviet delegation's train arrived at the Brest-Litovsk railway station. High Imperial dignitaries were present, along with the leaders of the Austrian and German armies, and a guard of honour was drawn up on the platform. Radek, however, unwilling to waste his time, proceeded on descending from the train to turn his back on all those august personages and, in the most natural way possible, began to distribute revolutionary leaflets among the soldiers of the guard of honour ...

The work of propaganda carried on by the Soviet delegation assumed a number of forms, and gave rise to vigorous protests by the leaders of the Austro-German delegation. Trotsky replied by inviting them to carry out propaganda for their point of view among the Russian troops ...

The exchange of ambassadors between Soviet Russian and Imperial Germany took place with more frankness than courtesy on the Soviet side. While the Bolshevik envoy refused to present letters of credit to Wilhelm II, the German envoy was met on his arrival in Moscow by an editorial in Pravda depicting him as 'not the representative of the toiling classes of a friendly people but the plenipotentiary of a military clique which, with boundless effrontery, kills, rapes and plunders wherever it can.' (1973, pp 374-5)

5 comments:

Jim Jepps said...

My question, to which I don't know the answer, is - how effective was it?

As a stunt leafleting "enemy" soldiers definitely worked because people still talk about it... but were there other concrete outcomes? As this is on the eve of a host of foreign nations invading Russia perhaps a different approach might have saved a few lives?

Phil said...

The answer is ... not very effective. But I don't think we should be too quick to condemn. At the time Radek, Trotsky and co - with some justification - felt a Europe-wide revolution was around the corner. To turn down an opportunity to propagandise and thus hasten the day was, from that point of view, quite rational.

But the soviet republic quickly learned. When the revolutionary tide receded by 1922 it was observing normal diplomatic protocols at the Genoa Conference aimed at normalising relations between it and the great powers.

Strategist said...

How one imagines Radek's entrance at Brest-Litovsk.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dsw9jYU_rJI

Rob W said...

This is exactly what I found in my masters research. Initially in both conduct and custom the academics and diplomats followed an entierly marxist tact, which as mentioned wasnt very effective. The ascention of Stalin saw a gradual reversal and the purges saw many marxist international theorists marched off to the Gulag. By the mid 30s for sure you could not tell the difference between the form and function of Soviet and western etiquette

Phil said...

Dead right. The same 'de-sovietisation' took place in the army, in the schools, in popular propaganda, etc.