Saturday 8 August 2020

Labour Party Treasurer - Vote Reg Cotterill

Among the internal Labour Party elections shortly due to take place, Reg Cotterill has put his name forward for members' consideration. I've known Reg for many years through blogging and social media stuff, and can confirm he is real as we've met on a couple of occasions. Principled, serious, thoughtful, and non-factional, I hope comrades consider nominating him for the job via their CLPs and support him when the ballots drop.

I am grateful to long-standing blogging comrade Phil for the opportunity to put forward my case for election as treasurer to the party. I will set out my ‘vision’ for the way in which the party should manage its finances, in the context of the work Labour needs to do during the great economic downturn we now face, alongside the existing climate emergency, and then summarize my relevant experience.

My starting premise is quite simple. There should be a presumption within the party that all finance coming into the party, from whatever source, should be distributed on a fair basis to Constituency Labour Parties, unless a solid business case, linked to the party’s strategy in UK parliamentary opposition, is accepted by those CLPs through an appropriate decision-making framework.

This constitutes an entire reversal of financial flows in the party. It is radical, but it also realistic about the amount of funding that local parties need to make a real difference in their area, and is so doing improve the electoral fortunes of Labour in that area.

I submitted proposals on these lines back in 2013 to the Collins Review, and I invite readers to review the detailed document. I would add the following as an attempt to make those proposals contemporary:

• Such a reversal of flows would not mean that CLPs would have to cope with much larger cash amounts than they currently handle. There would be a ‘virtual chequebook’ system, with actual transactions administered centrally or regionally, but under the control of CLPs (as happens with schools operating under local authority control);

• A welcome consequence of the reversal of financial flows would be to allow CLPs/groups of CLPs to appoint their own staff, with a concomitant decrease in staffing in Labour HQ and regional offices. This would not be immediate, but over time it would help the party move on from the kind of toxic culture that develops in powerful top down bureaucracies, even those peopled by talented, committed individuals (see here for my exploration);

• Such a change of flow, with more resources under CLP control, would need to be accompanied by a curtailing of the excess that is annual conference. While many of those who attend are fully committed to their role, there is no doubt that in some CLPs a significant amount of money goes on conference expenses which might be better used on work in those constituencies; what Covid has taught us is that virtual meetings can in fact be more inclusive than annual celebrity-focused jamborees, and we should make the shift now to embrace that new potential for member inclusion;

• Most important of all, money is needed at constituency level more than ever before. The massive hardship coming to our country in the wake of the government’s corrupted and incompetent handling of the pandemic, and its decade-long stripping of the social security safety net, mean that – like the early 1980s but much more so – local parties and movements will need to be ‘out there’, providing for the most vulnerable and engaging in effective local economic regeneration/sustainability In ways which also create models of action on the climate emergency. CLP funds will need to be used strategically as ‘pump-primers’, drawing in other resources both public and private, and inclusive of revised municipal investments and pension fund portfolios. There will be many ways of doing this, and no one size will fit all, though I would ask that my proposals on the development of Labour party-driven Community Benefit Societies tapping into the potential for withdrawable share under Society law, and the development of ‘holding companies’ for distressed local businesses in line with the plans being drawn up by the non-Tory devolved governments.

Irrespective of whether I become party treasurer, I hope these proposals might create interest and critical engagement from the Labour Grassroots movement, such that anti-treasurer elected has cause to bring them before the NEC and the leadership. Nevertheless, I am standing for the position of treasurer because I feel I have the skills to add this kind of value to the role myself.

I am currently treasurer to two national non-profit organisations focused on radical social change. I served as a councillor for eight years, and won my seat from the Tories to become the first ever Labour councillor for that ward. I know how to win elections. I served as leader for the opposition at borough level for two years before care responsibilities meant I had to take a break. I have served in governance roles in primary, secondary and higher education, and as Non-Executive Director in the NHS. I trained as a nurse, and was a union branch secretary and chair, before moving to Asia and Africa in aid work. When the pandemic began, I became a care worker in our hard-pressed care sector, and am now moving back to work in the NHS as the second wave approaches.

I think I have the skills, and credibility within the labour movement, to make my grassroots approach properly heard within Labour hierarchy. I am experienced enough to develop and adhere to the correct and rigorous assurance framework, in liaison with member auditors, to ensure that Labour members know what money is being spent where, and to what socialist cause, while also working strategically with Labour staff to develop a healthy financial future for the party in which our politics are free from the pressure of the vested interests of capital.

My wider analysis of where the Labour party is, and what it can become, can be found here (the draft of the first half of a book to be published in 2021).

If you feel able to nominate me at your CLP for the position of treasurer, I would of course be very grateful. I am available for question on @bickerrecord when I’m not at work, asleep, out with the dogs, or grappling with Kierkegaard.

7 comments:

Blissex said...

«all finance coming into the party, from whatever source, should be distributed on a fair basis to Constituency Labour Parties, unless a solid business case, linked to the party’s strategy in UK parliamentary opposition, is accepted by those CLPs»

This would mean a structure more like that of the Conservatives, where local associations are independent and there is a federation of associations that is often mistaken for the Conservative Party (but the Conservative Party is strictly parliamentarian, one can only be a member by being an MP or a lord). The consequence of that is that the central party ends up funded mostly by big donors, and in the case of Labour that no longer means the trade unions; but then your proposal would mean that even donations by big donors to the national party would be distributed to CLPs, and obviously no big donor would then make them.

«but it also realistic about the amount of funding that local parties need to make a real difference in their area, and is so doing improve the electoral fortunes of Labour in that area.»

It would mean that CLPs in in safe Labour seats with lots of members would be well funded, and those in marginals with fewer members would be a lot less well funded. Unless CLP funding was decided centrally according to a national strategy as in “accepted by those CLPs”, and then what would change? Either this proposal is to stop the redistribution of members subs from big CLPs in safe seats to smaller CLPs in marginals, or else it is pointless.

«local parties and movements will need to be ‘out there’, providing for the most vulnerable and engaging in effective local economic regeneration/sustainability [...] the development of Labour party-driven Community Benefit Societies»

Now that is indeed radical: it would transform CLPs into patronage and welfare organisations, rather more similar to charities than political parties. The CLPs would be competing as patronage and welfare organisations with local councils too with two interesting side effects:

* In areas without a Labour majority this scheme amounts to "taxing" Labour members *only*, to provide what should be public services.
* In Labour-controlled areas with lots of members subs the CLPs would also be competing with Labour-run local councils, or if complementing them, extending public services by raising "taxes" only on Labour members.

There is a more practical political issue: local politics tends to be far more corrupt than national politics, especially in areas with safe majorities where local party (whether Conservative, Labour or LibDem) cabals often run self-dealing "machines". It is in those areas that CLP patronage and welfare societies funded by member-only "taxes" would have the most money to distribute to "worthy" causes.

Blissex said...

«unless a solid business case, linked to the party’s strategy in UK parliamentary opposition, is accepted by those CLPs»

This looks like abolishing the NEC and replacing it with a "senate" of CLP chairpersons, or replacing it with per-CLP referendums on proposed strategy changes.

Reg Cotterill said...

Hi @blissex

Thanks for reading>

Couple of quick commments in order of your responses

1) Threat of party being funded by big donors:

It's quite the opposite. Membership income is redistributed across CLPs with an appropriate weighting around deprivation ad marginality but pro-rata''d mostly to member numbers, creating a recruitment incentive. The same happens to donor money where this is given as unrestricted, which the leadership would be encouraged to promote. Clearly this may be a cahallenge to some big donors but then any such donations would need to figure in the HQ level business plans submitted. This is ion detail in my Collins Review submission.

2) Well funded big CLPs etc

See above re: weighting to marginality but also need to incentivize recrtuitment

3) Welfare and patronage

If you look at the libked piece on Mead etc, this is about pump priming, not competing. So, it's looking at creating routes for councils to use nvestments more productively, not about competing as welfare organizations.

Community Benefit Societies operate under 2014 law, consolidating the Inudustrial & Provident Society legal peromissions (different from friendly societies) to offer non-transferable shares beyond the membership. CBSs would not be a formal part of the Labour party (sorry if "Labour-driven" is a bit unclear) but might have directors who happen to be party members, and they would not affect the more traditional political work of local partiies. See the linked piece on CBSs for detail, but compare also the growth of e.g. Uneemployment Resource Centres in the 1980s in terms of institutional distance from the part, which uses its new income to catalyze, not fund.

4) Corrupt local parties

Some are very well run. The way you get past any corruption of process is to encourage wider ownership by members. I can cover this in more detail in another piece based on lots of years experience in governance.

5) NEC abolition

This is an insightful point. It would not mean the abolition of the NEC as main rule maker but it would require the NEC to be more explicit about the approval of an HQ business plan at regional or sub-region level (or plans) for submission to assessment panels made up from CLPs.

Sorry this is a bit quick for starters. Hard to get all the detail into 900 words (hence links) but I will try to cover these and other issues as they rise



Alan Story said...

Reg: Will read this part of your book later.

"Things fall apart" indeed. Could even happen to the Labour Party. I do not write that in meanness, but as a possible development.

Blissex said...

«Membership income is redistributed across CLPs with an appropriate weighting around deprivation ad marginality but pro-rata''d mostly to member numbers, creating a recruitment incentive.»

That is not what is described by “unless a solid business case, linked to the party’s strategy in UK parliamentary opposition, is accepted by those CLPs”: either how much and with which weighting the subs are "redistributed across CLPs with an appropriate weighting“ must be “accepted by those CLPs“ and then there must be a way for each individual CLP to decide whether to accept or not that redistribution of *their* subs, or the system is pretty much the same as the current one, in which the national party decides.

And if it is the CLPs that decide to accept, what happens when some CLPs accept the proposed formula but some don't? Does the majority win? Do CLPs who don't accept keep all the subs?

Given that the argument is that CLP money should be largely used to fund or at least kickstart local patronage and welfare organizations, accepting that “redistributed across CLPs with an appropriate weighting” will be intensely debated.

«CBSs would not be a formal part of the Labour party (sorry if "Labour-driven" is a bit unclear) but might have directors who happen to be party members, and they would not affect the more traditional political work of local partiies»

But this means that the Labour Party would be giving a lot of members money to "pump prime" entities that it does not control beyond “might have directors who happen to be party members”.

«Community Benefit Societies operate under 2014 law»

And this is where things get rather hairy: they are clearly part of D Cameron's "Big Society" idea, under which social insurance and redevelopment initiatives should not be a part of local or national government responsibility, but they should be based on voluntary contributions (that is, a large chunk of taxes become optional) to NGOs.

While Labour party has always been involved with "self-help" societies, usually of a mutual nature though, and it is in permanent coalition with the Cooperative Party which is even more directly related to that, its main aim since 1945 has been to ensure that both social insurance is available to everyone and everyone contributes to it via general taxation.

A proposal to fund D Cameron's "Big Society" programme with Labour member subs may not be a such a brilliant idea, even if it is part of the Liberal tradition since victorian times.

If Labour members of a Liberal disposition think that D Cameron was right that local councils or central government should not be involved in patronage and welfare, or if they think that because of pervasive Liberal influence it is inevitable that local councils and national government won't be doing it, then having party-affiliated and maybe even CLP-funded mutual societies or charities could be the least bad option, but that may be a rather premature decision.

PS The catholic church also has a lot of affiliated patronage and welfare organizations, and in old times they used to be funded with a mandatory tithe, but I am not sure that should be a model for the Labour party membership.

Blissex said...

«Community Benefit Societies operate under 2014 law»

That means that it had been prepared at the same time as the Conservative-LibDem government had been cutting the central government grant to local councils in poorer areas (usually run by Labour), so as to cut their ability to spend on social care etc. at the same levels as local councils in richer areas (usually run by the Conservatives or LibDems); and probably this was done to claim that "voluntary organizations" could fill the funding gap their government had created.

«they are clearly part of D Cameron's "Big Society" idea, under which social insurance and redevelopment initiatives should not be a part of local or national government responsibility, but they should be based on voluntary contributions (that is, a large chunk of taxes become optional) to NGOs.»

There is a detail here that shows how clever the Conservatives and the Liberals are: the rules on local government financing say that if they want local councils can increase local taxes to fund any improvement the local councils want to make to local patronage and welfare, but each local tax increase above the cap (usually the CPI) has to be approved democratically in a local referendum.

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05682/
Since the 2012-13 financial year [...] Any authority proposing an excessive increase in council tax must hold a local referendum and obtain a ‘yes’ vote before implementing the increase.

As far as I know no Labour local council has ever dared to do that. The first one was scheduled for May this year and obviously got canceled:
https://www.warwickdc.gov.uk/info/20593/council_tax/1507/council_tax_referendum

The current proposal seems to be to implement D Cameron's Liberal programme, by "pump priming" funds to local area patronage and welfare, partially replacing the nearly-disappeared central government grants to poorer local councils, with Labour member subs rather than with unpopular local tax increases, members subs redistributed from bigger (not necessarily richer) CLPs to smaller CLPs, as long as the bigger CLPs vote to accept it. Perhaps I have misunderstood it. :-)

With the additional political advantage that this would either involve a reduction in funding for central party national campaigns, or result in increased membership subs (not increased donor funds, obviously).

Blissex said...

The other thing that I don't quite understand is what problems the proposal, which seems quite vague, is designed to fix, and which way they should be fixed:

* If more money should be spent on "pump priming" those "Big Society" organisations should the cost of a membership increase?

* If the cost of a membership should stay constant, which existing party budget items should receive less?

** Should subs be redistributed from big CLPs to smaller CLPs more or less than now, and to which CLPs more and which CLPs less?

** Should the share of the subs that goes to the national party be smaller or bigger?

* Who decides the answers to the questions above?

** The leader?

** The PLP?

** The NEC?

** Majority voting of CLP chairmen?

** Majority voting of members voting in each CLP?

** Are CLPs who voted against the proposed distribution of subs obliged to share their subs according to the decisions of the majority?

** Would instead each CLP receive all their subs and vote by themselves how much of their budget to share with with the central party and other CLPs?

And all these details should be settled in the context of how much party members money should be given to local non-affiliated patronage and welfare "Big Society" organisations to "pump prime" (potentially for a long period) them to supplement existing (and often shrinking) the welfare activities of local councils and state agencies.

An easy solution to declare each CLP as an autonomous entity, and leave to the paying members of that CLP to decide how to use their own money in every respect (how much to send to the central party, to other CLPs, to non-affiliated "Big Society" organisations, or spend on CLP events, leaflets/posters. etc.).